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[754] The books under review join the debate on the acceptable extent of interference 
with human rights in the pursuit of political and military objectives. Their 
respective scopes of analysis are, however, ostensibly different. Law, Ethics and the 
War on Terror by Matthew Evangelista explores the legal and ethical dilemmas of 
counter-terrorism, and it focuses on controversial developments in international 
law prompted by state practice rather than by moral concepts. Terrorism and 
Counter-Terrorism. Ethics and Liberal Democracy by Seumas Miller offers an ethical- 
philosophical analysis of the permissible boundaries of organized political vio- 
lence, whether terrorism or counter-terrorism. 
Evangelista discusses whether state behavior (for example, treatment of terror- 
ist suspects ⁄ civilians in conflict zones) can generate new, less protective inter- 
national human rights norms (chapter 1). The author argues that the war on 
terror has led to setbacks in many areas in which the efforts of the transnational 
civil society had fostered human-rights enhancing norms (for example, the ban 
on certain weapons or methods of warfare such as antipersonnel mines, the stig- 
matization and prohibition of torture, the prosecution of individuals for mass 
atrocities). He suggests, nevertheless, that widespread reactions might lead to fur- 
ther restrictions on states’ discretion. 
Miller enquires whether there are circumstances in which the use of lethal 
force against non-combatants for political causes can be morally justified, and 
the infringement upon civil liberties to protect citizens against terrorist attacks 
can be deemed acceptable. Miller examines high-profile terrorist campaigns and 
emphasizes the differences between them, for example, action maximizing the 
loss of innocent life (Al-Qaeda) versus action seeking to discriminate amongst 
targets (African National Congress’ struggle against the apartheid state of South 
Africa) (chapter 1, ‘‘The varieties of terrorism’’). The author maintains that 
effective counter-terrorism might require political solutions in addition to mili- 
tary and policing measures, because sometimes terrorism stems from legitimate 
grievances. 
Both authors address the problem of defining terrorism, albeit from different 
perspectives. While Evangelista demonstrates that state abuses justified as coun- 
ter-terrorism are enabled by the lack of an international consensus on a 
definition, Miller illustrates how existing definitions do not properly reflect the 
moral distinction between terrorist and non-terrorist acts. 
[755] Many scholars acknowledge the importance of a worldwide agreement on the 
meaning of terrorism, and warn against the vagueness and overbreadth of defini- 
tions in current anti-terrorism norms (Weigend 2006:928–929). Evangelista 
argues that the reversal of human-rights protections partly derives from the 
absence, in UN anti-terrorism instruments, of a general definition of terrorism 
providing the basis for collective action, and avoiding terrorist-labeling opportun- 
ism (chapter 2). He evokes the debate over the inclusion of state terrorism, 
characterized as violence perpetrated by state officials domestically against inno- 
cent civilians to enforce discipline, deter regime disobedience, or through delib- 
erate attacks against civilian populations during war, in any general definition. 
He also discusses the status of freedom fighters and challenges the theory that 
political assassinations (targeted killings of state officials) as a tool against repres- 
sive regimes are morally acceptable and do not amount to terrorism. He rejects 
the introduction of a judgment value on the justice of the cause in the definition 
of political assassinations and notes that excluding them from terrorism offenses 
may encourage state-sponsored assassination of political leaders. He also main- 
tains that, despite the lack of a universal definition, the current normative trend 
indicates that political motivations no longer suffice to prevent certain acts from 
being defined as terrorism. 
Miller’s attempt at a definition of terrorism is premised on some generally 
undisputed elements: violent action aimed at changing the behavior of some 
social ⁄ political group, in order to further political ⁄ military goals, and relying on 
publicity to cause widespread fear in the targeted group (chapter 2). For the 
author, the contentious elements are the target of such violence and the meth- 
ods employed. He uses examples to test existing definitions of terrorism focused 
on either the innocent or non-combatant status of victims, and he concludes that 
they are unable to account for certain (state or non-state) terrorist patterns, or 
to exclude organized political violence not amounting to terrorism. He offers a 
negative definition of targets: whoever is not a military combatant, human rights 
violator, or revolutionary. He argues that methods, to be considered terrorist, 
must constitute human-rights violations in the specific context (wartime, well- 
ordered society or state of emergency), and could be inferred from domestic 
and international criminal norms on violent actions, which express the moral 
agreement on the unacceptability of certain acts. Inquiring whether there are 
morally justifiable forms of terrorism, Miller rejects specious arguments such as 
the ‘‘collective moral responsibility’’ for the injustices terrorists seek to redress; 
however, he argues it might be morally justified to use lethal force against civil- 
ians responsible for human-rights violations (for example, those engaged in a 
war of conquest, ethnic cleansing), or for certain omissions (for example, failure 
to dispense available medicines ⁄ enforce subsistence rights), albeit under limited 
circumstances (chapter 3). For Miller, killing non-violent rights violators to 
restore rights should either not be criminalized and considered terrorism, 
because non-violent rights violators forfeit civilian immunity, or alternatively be 
deemed as morally justified terrorism. This position underpins arguments that 
definitions of terrorism cannot be isolated from moral judgments about what 
constitutes justifiable violence (Thackrah 2004:75–77). 
Both authors also examine counter-terrorism as war. Evangelista uses U.S. 
counter-terrorism policy to illustrate the abuses stemming from the rhetoric and 
logic of the war against terror. He stresses that, following the Bush administra- 
tion’s characterization of the attacks of September 11, 2001 as acts of war, crimi- 
nal justice was replaced by targeted killings in states harboring terrorists, 
extraordinary renditions, torturous interrogation methods, secret detention facili- 
ties abroad, and trials by special military commissions rather than regularly 
constituted courts affording all judicial guarantees (chapter 3). He discusses high 
profile human-rights violations, such as the treatment of Guantanamo prisoners 
[756] violating the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The author considers other troubling 
legal developments, such as the possible emergence of a norm allowing preven- 
tive war (chapter 4). While some advocate ‘‘anticipatory self-defense’’ as the only 
effective means against non-state actors reluctant to negotiation (Howard 2009), 
the author argues that a norm permitting preventive war would have dire conse- 
quences for human rights. He maintains that, despite the worldwide opposition 
to the war in Iraq and UN refusal to endorse it, the conflation sought by the 
U.S. administration between preemption (war directed against imminent attack) 
and prevention (war motivated by merely potential threats) might be propelled 
by the ambiguous reactions of the international community. He notes, however, 
that states’ behavior is not sufficient for the formation of custom, which also 
requires the conviction that practice responds to a legal obligation, rather than 
being an exceptional departure from the rule. He also considers whether regime 
change is an admissible goal in waging war on terror. Evangelista views it as prob- 
lematic insofar as, under international law, military occupation should not 
impede the return to the status quo ante (chapter 5). The author also focuses 
on the paradox of humanitarian intervention: while it presupposes sympathy for 
the civilian populations at stake, intervening states attempt to minimize losses 
among their own soldiers at the expense of greater risks for foreign civilians 
through subcontracting local forces, employing private military corporations dif- 
ficult to hold accountable, aerial bombardment causing mass-casualties, and 
destruction of infrastructure constituting dual-use targets. 
Miller takes the view that, in a war-like situation, terrorist-combatants are 
unlawful combatants whose methods breach the laws of war, hence they are war 
criminals rather than ordinary criminals. For Miller, policies such as shoot-on- 
sight and targeted assassinations of known terrorists can be morally justified in 
de facto theatres of war, but under strict conditions: treating terrorism as a crime 
cannot contain the ongoing attacks while treating it as war is likely to do so; they 
are proportionate to the terrorist threat, and applied only with respect to the 
specific area concerned and over the necessary timespan; the overall and security 
consequences brought about are better than competing strategies (chapter 5). 
Even then, he argues, fundamental moral principles on human rights must be 
observed (for example, innocent non-citizens cannot be sacrificed to save own citizens,  
especially if combatants). Miller also examines the moral chal- 
lenge posed by research in biological sciences, in particular the potential use of 
genetic engineering techniques to launch bioterrorist attacks (chapter 7). He 
argues that, notwithstanding the risks that scientific developments become 
increasingly available to terrorists, research should be allowed to continue, for 
two reasons: existing information is already a risk to security, and scientific 
advances can provide solutions against viruses used as weapons of mass destruc- 
tion. He suggests, however, that greater levels of security and strict regulation of 
the procedures are needed for research institutions. 
It has been noted that the misleading overuse of the term ‘‘war’’ in the anti- 
terrorism context affects the protection of human rights (Duffy 2005:339–340). 
Both Evangelista and Miller stress the importance of distinguishing the context 
in which counter-terrorism takes place (peacetime, state of emergency, war), as it 
shapes what constitutes a legitimate response to terrorist acts. Evangelista empha- 
sizes the constitutional implications of post-2001 legislation: it centralizes powers 
in the hands of executives, restrains civil liberties (for example, surveillance of 
citizens), especially under catch-all UN Security Council anti-terrorism resolu- 
tions. He argues that the emergence of more permissive customary laws would 
signal a regress for human rights, and that the eradication of terrorism is better 
helped by the adherence to human-rights standards. 
Drawing on the same distinction between terrorism as criminal behavior and 
terrorism as act of war, Miller underscores that some terrorist acts, committed  
[757] outside a war context, are almost ordinary crimes, for which perpetrators should 
be investigated, tried and punished (chapter 4). However, he argues, unlike 
ordinary crimes, terrorist actions are more destabilizing to law and order: they 
presuppose recurrent patterns, instilling fear, and ultimately an attack on the 
state itself, as they pursue political or military goals. Hence the permissibility of 
some interference with the rights and freedoms of the citizenry in a liberal state 
(free speech, privacy etc.). He stresses that the increased police authority should, 
nonetheless, be accompanied by clearly defined limits and accountability, and 
that no trade-off should be allowed between the right to life of a few, and the 
theoretical rights of others. According to the author, to be morally justified, a 
law permitting institutionalized practices that encroach upon human rights must 
meet higher requirements than a one-off action (which might be morally 
justified in a certain context, albeit it is not and ought not be legal). He also 
concedes that infringements on citizens’ right to life and freedom (shooting-on- 
sight, indefinite detention without trial) are not acceptable in a context falling 
short of war. A third context, between well-ordered peaceful situations and war, 
is the state of emergency, entailing rights restrictions; for Miller such a state is 
justifiable, provided that it is legally circumscribed, i.e. precise powers are con- 
ferred upon governmental agencies, and rules on termination of those powers are established, 
as well as judicial oversight on their exercise. As Miller suggests, the conceptual 
confusion between peacetime, state of emergency and war conditions blurs the 
distinctions of what is appropriate for police authorities and what is not. 
Both authors give special emphasis to the sensitive issue of the use of torture 
to prevent terrorist attacks. They embrace slightly different positions: Evangelista 
advocates for absolute prohibition, whereas Miller contends that it should be 
permitted exceptionally, contingent upon very strict criteria, but not institution- 
alized. 
Evangelista recalls the moral and pragmatic arguments for opposition to tor- 
ture such as no exceptional justifications for torturing a human being, inefficient 
tool in obtaining reliable information ⁄ deterring crimes, possible torture of inno- 
cents, negative precedent (chapter 3). The author argues that, by torturing 
detainees, the United States clearly violated unquestionable legal and moral prin- 
ciples, and thus its practice is unlikely to evolve into a new custom, although it 
has been emulated by other states. However, the author believes that the ambig- 
uous U.S. and international reactions to torture and extraordinary renditions 
have debilitated the stigma previously attached to it by the efforts of human- 
rights activists. 
Conversely, Miller argues that torture of known terrorists might be morally jus- 
tifiable under extreme circumstances: the police know they are in the process of 
completing their action (for example, detonate a nuclear device), they refuse to 
provide the information necessary to impede it (defuse the bomb), and torturing 
them is necessary and sufficient to save innocent people (chapter 6). The author 
thus addresses the ‘‘ticking bomb’’ scenario, which others have challenged on 
various grounds: the unrealistically high level of certainty required, the ineffec- 
tiveness of it in eliciting information, and the moral compromise, which may cre- 
ate precedent (Joseph 2007). However, Miller maintains that legalization of 
torture is in no circumstance morally justified, it is unnecessary, and a threat to 
liberal-democratic institutions. 
The books under review provide engaging insights on the topics discussed, 
though occasionally the solutions suggested actually bring about further dilem- 
mas. Thus, Miller’s distinction between a law and a one-off morally justified 
action that ought not to be legalized prompts the question of whether police- 
men acting under such ‘‘justifiable’’ circumstances should still be subject to 
criminal responsibility. One might also inquire how the exceptional framework 
for legitimate political assassination, or for torture, based on clear-cut informa-  
[758] tion, would work in practice. Several issues appear unsettled, such as the possibil- 
ity Evangelista alludes to, that state terrorism may be more appropriately covered 
by war crimes or crimes against humanity rather than included in a general defi- 
nition of terrorism. The contrasting reflections the books offer on core aspects 
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